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Abusive Supervision Detection as Part of Independent Venture
Capital Due Diligence of Management
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Abusive supervision (AS) costs U.S. businesses billions of dollars per year in lost
productivity, increased absenteeism, and health care costs. To reduce these costs and to
enhance the probability of a successful exist, independent venture capitalists (IVCs) need to
be aware of the issue of AS among the management team during the due-diligence process.
This study addresses a gap in literature related to IVCs being able to detect AS during duediligence process of the management team. The research question was this: What tools,
processes, and methods can IVCs use to detect AS during the due-diligence process of the
management team? Four tools, processes, and methods were presented to help reduce the
frequency of employee abuse and associated costs.
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Introduction
This article is based on the supposition independent venture capitalists (IVCs) appear to lack
awareness, requisite tools, processes, and methods to identify and understand abusive supervision
(AS) occurring in the management team during the due-diligence process. IVCs appear to lack
knowledge of the disruptive nature and detrimental effects of AS on competitive advantage of a
preportfolio firm (K. J. Harris, Harvey, Harris, & Cast, 2013; J. Liu, Kwan, Wu, & Wu 2010; D. Liu,
Liao, & Loi, 2012; Tepper, Duffy, Henle, & Lambert, 2006). A preportfolio firm is an organization
being considered by the IVC for investing but the IVC has not come to terms with company
management (Jackson, Bates, & Bradford, 2012). The cost of AS to U.S. companies is estimated to be
over $24 billion per year stemming from productivity losses, increased absenteeism, and increased
health care costs (J. Liu et al., 2010; D. Liu et al., 2012; Martinko, Harvey, Brees, & Mackey, 2013;
Tepper et al., 2006).
AS affects an estimated 13.6% of U.S. workers (Palanski, Avey, & Jiraporn, 2014). By conducting due
diligence on the management team related to AS, IVCs might be able to increase profitability, reduce
costs, restore trust, and decrease suspicion of management among employees (Tran, Tian & Sankoh,
2013). To reduce these costs and to enhance the probability of a successful exist, IVCs need to be
cognizant of the issue of AS among the management team during the due-diligence process. A
successful exit occurs when the IVC realizes a return on investment by selling an interest in the
portfolio company via an initial public offering (IPO), acquisition, merger, or sale (Strömsten &
Waluszewski, 2012; Zhang, Aksu, & Wang, 2012). For the remainder of this article, I provide a
statement of the problem and purpose of the research, significance of the research, the research
question, methodological approach, literature review, findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
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Statement of the Problem and Purpose
The problem to be addressed is that IVCs lack tools, processes, and methods to detect AS during the
due-diligence process of the management team leading to a successful exit, which occurs when an
IVC sells an interest in the portfolio company via an IPO, acquisition, merger, or sale. IVCs appear not
to be aware that AS is estimated to cost U.S. companies over $24 billion per year (J. Liu et al., 2010;
D. Liu et al., 2012; Martinko et al,, 2013; Tepper et al., 2006). IVCs appear not to understand the
disruptive nature and detrimental effects of AS on competitive advantage of a preportfolio firm (J.
Liu et al., 2010; D. Liu et al., 2012; Tepper et al., 2006). To reduce costs, lower the instances of AS,
and to enhance the probability of a successful exit, IVCs must be aware of AS among the
management team during the due-diligence process. The purpose of this qualitative study is to
increase awareness of AS and offer tools, processes, and methods to help detect AS during the duediligence process of the management team. The goal is to enhance portfolio firm competitive
advantage and to provide IVCs with tools, processes, and methods leading to successful exits. AS
produces negative outcomes for employees, the organization, and other stakeholders, which can
influence IVCs consideration in investing in the preportfolio organization (MacKenzie, Garavan, &
Carbery, 2011). It is hoped that by identifying managers who engage in AS and ameliorating the
condition, trust can be restored, suspicion decreased, and blaming others lessened might lead to
successful exits, which again, occur when the IVC realizes a return on investment by selling an
interest in the portfolio company via an IPO, acquisition, merger, or sale (Strömsten & Waluszewski,
2012; Tran et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2012).

Significance of Research
This research is significant for IVCs to understand AS exists, how to detect AS, and to make more
prudent decisions whether to invest in the preportfolio firm. By understanding what AS is and
observe instances when conducting due diligence of the management team, IVCs might become more
aware of AS and have reduced asymmetry of information whether to invest in the firm. IVCs can use
tools, processes, and methods offered in this research during the due-diligence process of the
management team to enhance profitability, reduce productivity losses, lower absenteeism rates, and
decrease health care costs leading to successful exits.

Research Question
The primary question driving this research was this: What tools, processes, and methods can IVCs
use to detect AS during the due-diligence process of the management team leading to successful
exits?

Methodological Approach
This study is a qualitative review of the extant literature responding to the research question. The
method used to review literature is systematic review. Researchers use systematic review in
addressing a specific research question derived from the extant literature (Okoli, 2015; Rajaeian,
Cater-Steel, & Lane, 2017). In a systematic review, researchers seek to search for, appraise, and
synthesize research evidence focused on and exhaustive and comprehensive search primarily of peer
reviewed articles (Glock, Grosse, & Ries, 2017). In a systematic review, the researcher aims to
understand what is known and what still is unknown, uncertainty of the findings, recommendations
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for further research, and recommendation for practice (Glock & Grosse, 2015; Glock et al., 2017).
Researchers use systematic review to provide an objective approach toward reducing bias (Bearman
& Dawson, 2013). The review helps researchers identify and critically appraise pertinent research by
collecting, analyzing, and reporting results from peered and non-peered-reviewed information
(Hochrein, Glock, Bogaschewsky, & Heider, 2015). Of the 80 resources used in this article, 75 (94%)
came from peer-reviewed published articles, and five (6%) came from from dissertations, books, and
websites. Criteria for inclusion and exclusion of resources focused on the research question and
available resources. Articles, books, dissertations, and authoritative websites written in English
pertaining to independent venture capital, AS, and due diligence published between 2000 and 2017
were included. Included studies were considered acceptable contingent upon research conducted and
analyses provided with representative and reasonable sample size meeting reliability and validity
criteria published with major academic outlets whenever possible (Glock & Grosse, 2015; Glock et
al., 2017). Nonauthoritative websites, blogs, wikis, articles not written in English, and articles
outside the focus of the research question were excluded.
Five steps exist in systematic review. First, the researcher frames the research question(s) for review
(Khan, Kunz, Kleijnen, & Antes, 2003, Knoll, 2017). For this study, the research question is this:
What tools, processes, and methods can IVCs use to detect AS during the due-diligence process of the
management team leading to successful exits? Key terms used were abusive supervision, abusive
supervision detection, due diligence, due-diligence processes, due-diligence tools, due-diligence methods,
independent venture capitalists, management due diligence, independent venture capital decisionmaking, and management assessment of independent venture capital decision-making. Key terms
were identified by a review of the literature.
The second step is to find relevant studies (Khan et al., 2003; Knoll, 2017). For this study, academic
resources were accessed from (a) EBSCOhost, (b) ProQuest, (c) ScienceDirect, (d) Academic Search,
(e) ABI/INFORM, (f) Emerald, (g) Springer, (h) SAGE Journals, (i) John Wiley and Sons, and (j)
Taylor and Francis.
The third step is to assess the quality of the studies (Khan et al., 2003; Knoll, 2017). Journals used in
this article were assessed under the assumption the peer-review process is a reliable indicator that
the literature review, research methods, threats to validity, and the accuracy of reporting of
findings/results were addressed and are acceptable by a thorough examination of at least two
independent experts in the same field. I reviewed as many peer-reviewed articles as possible to
collect data to minimize bias. Researcher bias and confirmation bias were assessed as potential
threats in this article. Researcher bias was mitigated by identifying inclusion criteria for primary
studies. Criteria included data related to IVCs, due diligence, and AS. Confirmation bias was a
threat to article retrieval and data analysis because I could have a specific belief on the effects of AS
relative to IVC due diligence of the management team. To mitigate confirmation bias, I continually
reevaluate impressions from data presented in the articles and challenged my preexisting
assumptions.
The fourth step is to summarize the evidence (Khan et al., 2003; Knoll, 2017). Evidence was derived from the
extant literature. No primary data were collected for this study. The search strategy was to use
databases such as (a) EBSCOhost, (b) ProQuest, (c) ScienceDirect, (d) Academic Search, (e)
ABI/INFORM, (f) Emerald, (g) Springer, (h) SAGE Journals, (i) John Wiley and Sons, and (j) Taylor
and Francis. Quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-methods articles were included. Some non-peerInternational Journal of Applied Management and Technology
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reviewed articles were selected when relative peered articles were unavailable. Articles and books
that did not pertain to IVC, due diligence, AS, management assessments, elements of a successful exit,
tools, processes, and methods to detect AS were eliminated. Information was retrieved related to AS, IVCs,
factors informing IVC decision-making, management assessment of IVC decision-making, and management due
diligence.
The fifth step is to interpret findings (Khan et al., 2003; Knoll, 2017). An interpretation of findings is
offered in the results section. Data was analyzed and synthesized from the extant literature. As
outlined in the research literature and in the rest of this article, an indication in the literature is AS
can have a negative outcome on organizational performance, competitive advantage, and success. It
is expected the literature review will provide sufficient information to respond effectively to the
research question.

Literature Review
Abusive Supervision
AS is considered as the routine and sustained display of verbal and nonverbal behaviors exhibited
publicly or privately by managers in which the employee perceives as threatening, bullying, or
humiliating (Lui et al., 2012; Mawritz, Mayer, Hoobler, Wayne, & Marinova, 2012; Tepper, 2000;
Tepper, Moss, & Duffy, 2011). Examples of verbal and nonverbal behaviors include (a) being rude, (b)
acting in a coercive manner, (c) making derogatory comments, (d) spreading rumors, (e) withholding
information, (f) taking undue credit for an employee’s work, (g) invading privacy, and (h) giving an
employee the “silent treatment” (Chan & McAllister, 2014; Lui et al., 2012). The recipient of AS often
exhibits (a) burnout, (b) anxiety, (c) work withdrawal, (d) insomnia, (e) fear, and (f) psychological
exhaustion (Chan & McAllister, 2014; Mackey, Ellen, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2013; Tepper, 2000).
Employees who have an abusive supervisor deal with (a) job tension, (b) public criticism, (c) loud and
angry tantrums, (d) inconsiderate actions, (e) paranoia, and (f) distrust (Chan & McAllister, 2014;
Mackey et al., 2013; Tepper, 2000). AS is not an issue of “one bad apple” or a one-time occurrence but
is a routine, consistent, and complex interaction pattern between management and employees
(Hoobler & Hu, 2013). AS often starts with managers and filters to employees (Mawritz et al., 2012).
Employees often imitate the behaviors experienced from managers (Pearce & Manz, 2014).
AS is a subjective assessment because one or more persons could interpret a manager’s behavior as
abusive in one setting yet nonabusive in another context (Harvey, Harris, Gillis, & Martinko, 2014).
An employee’s psychological and social adaptive perceptions might be instrumental in detecting
abuse (Mackey et al., 2013). Kacmar, Whitman, and Harris (2013) suggested work environments are
often unpredictable and might create feelings of uncertainty of employees’ future with the
organization. Employees who experience AS often feel the organization does not recognize their
value, become dissatisfied with the job, and intend to quit (D. Liu et al., 2012). AS diminishes an
employee’s motivation to excel and reduces creativity resulting in productivity loses (D. Liu et al.,
2012). Employees victimized by AS often encounter decreased overall life and job satisfaction and
have higher instances of work/family conflicts (Mackey et al., 2013).
To cope with AS, useful strategies include (a) ingratiation, (b) communication, (c) avoidance, (d)
talking to others, and (e) engaging in reassuring thoughts (Yagil, Ben-Zur, & Tamir, 2010). However,
Yagil et al. found most coping strategies are ineffective in reducing AS. Abused employees often use
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avoidant or active coping strategies. Avoidant coping takes the form of physically and psychologically
removing oneself from the situation, maintaining physical distance between the employee and
manager, not coming to work, and/or increased reliance on drugs and alcohol (Tepper et al., 2006).
Active coping is communicating AS experiences to the manager (Tepper et al., 2006). Tepper noted
employees who are subjected to AS are more likely to use avoidant coping than active coping.
However, active coping is deemed a more effective coping mechanism (Tepper et al., 2006).
Extant research suggested AS is negatively associated with job satisfaction (Glambek, Matthiesen,
Hetland, & Einarsen, 2014; Velez & Neves, 2017), organizational commitment (Glambek et al., 2014;
Shoss, Eisenberger, Restubog, & Zagenczyk, 2013), and positively related to intentions to quit
(Glambek et al., 2014). Tepper, Moss, Lockhart, and Carr (2007) found perceived AS experiences
mediated the effects of AS on employees’ attitudes. Glambek et al. noted experiences of irritation and
the fear derived from AS related to aggressive behaviors in employees. AS has been linked with
deviant organizational behaviors such as ridicule or giving the silent treatment; actions violating
organizational norms, and behaviors and actions that might threaten the organization and/or
employees (Thoroughgood, Tate, Sawyer, & Jacobs, 2012).
Mitchell and Ambrose (2007) found a positive relationship between AS and supervisor-directed
deviance. Mitchell and Ambrose argued supervisor-directed deviance often takes the form of acting
rudely. Supervisor-directed deviance can be construed as interpersonal deviance where the
supervisor plays pranks or says hurtful words to employees (Martinko et al., 2013). Supervisordirected deviance can also be acts of fraud and or theft against the company (Ahmad & Omar, 2013).
The relationship between AS and supervisor-directed deviance is greater among employees who
subscribed to the concept of tit-for-tat (Mackey, Frieder, Perrewe, Gallagher, & Brymer, 2015). In
such a scenario, abused employees often retaliate against the abusive supervisor in an aggressive
manner and resent management other employees within the organization (Mackey et al., 2015).
Aryee, Sun, Chen, and Debrah (2008) found AS was related to abused employees’ job performance
and sense of self-esteem. Aryee et al. found abused employees whose self-esteem was low, AS was
unrelated to employee deviance behavior; however, for employees with high self-esteem, AS was
positively related to work deviance.
Challenges exist associated with studying AS. Tepper (2000) mentioned researchers often rely on
subjective reports to measure AS. A problem with subjective reports is some people might
underestimate the level of AS exposure from an unwillingness to admit to have been victimized
while others might exaggerate management behavior (Shoss et al., 2013). A related complication is
gathering data from abused employees who are unwilling self-identified (Tepper et al., 2006).
AS can result in high costs, create disruption, and have detrimental effects on the competitive
advantage of a preportfolio firm. Abusive managers put organizations at a competitive disadvantage
(Allen, Bryant, & Vardaman, 2010). Employees who must work with an abusive supervisor often
refuse to conform to the supervisor’s instructions and are unconcerned about consequences
associated with not conforming to management compliance standards (Tepper et al., 2006).
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Independent Venture Capitalists
Overview
IVCs invest in new, high growth, high risk, and market scalable companies known as portfolio firms
(Blum, 2015; Olsson, Frydenberg, Jakobsen, & Jessen, 2010). IVC firms are the dominant source of
equity funding for new entrepreneurial, market scalable, high-growth, high-risk, and early-stage
high-technology business ventures (Jackson et al., 2012; Li & Zahra, 2012; Olsson et al., 2010;
Schertler & Tykvova, 2011). In addition to equity funding and attempting to maximize return on
investment, IVCs provide managerial services, strategic advice, sit on boards, monitor management
actions, hire key personnel, engage with strategic partners, and provide access to extensive networks
of potential customers and suppliers (Bhagat, 2013; Rajan, 2010).
The goals of the IVC are to create value for high net worth investors and to complete a successful
exit (Jackson et al., 2012; Li & Zahra, 2012; Olsson et al., 2010; Schertler & Tykvova, 2011). IVCs
rarely take over a portfolio firm preferring to liquidate investments at a future date via an exit
(Bhagat, 2013). The IVC adds value during the exit process by helping to locate investment bankers
and to present the portfolio company to public investors (Rajan, 2010). IVCs expect to generate 30%
to 50% annual growth before agreeing to additional funding (Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009). The IVC
investment carries no guarantee of a return on investment (Rajan, 2010).
IVCs comb through thousands of business plans yearly searching and scrutinizing firms having the
highest probability of achieving a successful exit (Bhagat, 2013). Once a firm is selected for potential
investment, the IVC will conduct due diligence. As part of due diligence, IVCs meet with
management teams, valuate performance metrics, discern market scalability, and determine
whether the company’s product(s) or service(s) meet an everyday need among other factors (Blum,
2013). The focus of this study is due diligence of the management team pertaining to AS.
IVC firms fill a critical intermediary function by not only providing equity funding to high risk,
market scalable, high growth portfolio firms, but creating value for high net worth investors
(Jackson et al., 2012; Olsson et al., 2010; Schertler & Tykvova, 2011). Zhang et al. (2012) found that
IVC firms play a critical role is positively shaping new firms. Rather than taking over a firm, IVCs
prefer to liquidate investments in portfolio companies at a future date usually through an IPO, sale,
merger, or acquisition (Zhang et al., 2012).
The proportion of companies that receive IVC funding is very small (Rajan, 2010). While the United
States leads the world in IVC firms, IVC firms are not a major source of capital for small businesses
(Rajan, 2010). Although IVC firms receive more than 1,000 requests for funding annually (Cumming,
Schmidt, & Walz, 2010), Kaplan and Lerner (2010) indicated that only one sixth of 1% of new
businesses obtain IVC funding. Factoring for the growth of the economy and the stock market, Rajan
(2010) and Jackson et al. (2012) inferred that the availability of IVC funding has increased steadily
over the years because IVC investing in early stage companies has a lower likelihood of reaching an
exit. Jackson et al. espoused that new IVC firms have elevated financial risks compared to those of
firms with a proven performance record.
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Factors Influencing Independent Venture Capital Decision-Making
The venture capital investment process involves several judgments and decision-making
considerations made under uncertainty and asymmetry of information (Li & Zahra, 2012; Zhang,
2011). Key factors that determine IVC investment decision-making process focus on the (a)
entrepreneur’s personality, (b) entrepreneur’s experience, (c) the organization’s products and
services, (d) organization’s market or industry, (f) financial considerations, (g) risks, (h) valuation, (i)
portfolio size and scope, (j) management skills, and (k) exiting (Dhochak & Sharma, 2016). The
entrepreneur’s personality/chemistry is the probably most significant factor of the IVCs investment
decision (Blum, 2015). IVCs look for amicable personality, honesty and honesty above other
characteristics such as leadership quality, a do what it takes attitude, integrity, confidence and
commitment (Blum, 2015). IVC firms carefully review personal chemistry with the preportfolio
management team, as the parties may be working with each other for several years (Blum, 2015).
Looking beyond the management team, the IVC needs to evaluate the attractiveness and risks of the
investment opportunity, considering factors as market size, strategy, technology, customer adoption,
competitive advantage, quality, and the industry experience of the management team (Blum, 2013).
Preportfolio firms generally do not have an established credit history, forcing the firm to seek IVC
capital assistance (Blum, 2015). The analysis conducted by the IVC firm focuses on assessing the
capabilities of the management team of the preportfolio firm (Gaddya, Sivaram, Jones, & Wayman,
2017). IVCs invest billions of dollars in first-round equity financing for new ventures each year, and
investment screening is the primary method used to decide which entrepreneur to fund (Jia & Wang,
2017).
The entrepreneur’s experience is another noteworthy consideration in the investment decisionmaking process. An entrepreneur should have a managerial record of success, has start-up
experience, deep product market/industry expertise, and business acumen (Dhochak & Sharma,
2016). The products and services offered are critical to an investment decision. The product or
service should serve an everyday need yet be innovative, scalable, patentable, and exhibits a clear
competitive advantage (Blum, 2013). Market is a key consideration in investment decision-making
(Dhochak & Sharma, 2016).
IVCs typically invest in portfolio firms that exhibit long-term, little liquidity, high-risk equity with
the promise of high return on investment (Rajan, 2010). IVCs invest at the early as well as later
stages in the portfolio firm's life cycle (Rajan, 2010). Most IVCs view an IPO as the preferred exit
strategy with the central goal to achieve the highest ROI to increase shareholder value and market
valuation for the portfolio firm (Rajan, 2010). In this respect, a strategic trade-off exists between
aiming for growth or profitability of the portfolio firm (Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, & Müller, 2013).
Portfolio firms favor growth, while IVCs favor profitability (Blum, 2015). Generally, IVC-funded
firms strive to become market leaders in fast growth markets to command a premium at the IPO
(Dhochak & Sharma, 2016).
Risk and returns are directly proportional to each other. IVCs investment always has an estimation
of systematic risk or beta within its venture (Dhochak & Sharma, 2016). R. S. Harris, Jenkinson,
and Kaplan (2014) noted a fund’s portfolio diversification model and estimated an average  of 1.12
for venture funds. IVCs consider riskiness of a venture while taking investing decision (Dhochak &
Sharma, 2016).
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Several considerations influence the valuation of IVC investments. Valuations occur only when a
portfolio company has refinanced a loan or anticipate an exit event (Korteweg & Sorensen, 2010).
Bartkus and Hassan (2009) indicated that portfolio companies in California and Massachusetts had
higher rates of capital inflows than portfolio firms did in other states. In addition, most IVC firms
and IVC funding in the United States occurs in California or Massachusetts (Bartkus & Hassan,
2009).
The IVC members decide the funding level for portfolio firms based on the facts gathered during the
screening, negotiation, and due-diligence process. In exchange for providing capital funding, the IVC
expects the portfolio firms to generate 30% to 50% annual growth in value before agreeing to
capitalize subsequent funding stages (Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009). The challenge for both parties is that
IVCs view portfolio firm valuations as unrealistic, while the portfolio firms interpret IVCs’
valuations as unreasonably stringent (Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009).
High volatility from valuations in public equity markets mixed with economic and competition
uncertainties are rampant in the IVC industry (Blum, 2013). An increase in IPO valuations often
prompts younger IVCs to raise more funds from investors (Blum, 2013). A statistically strong
correlation exists between the rate of return of IVC funding and the overall market returns (Guo,
Lou, & Pérez-Castrillo, 2015).
IVCs prefer to invest in a portfolio rather than a single investment, which ultimately affects their
investment strategies and returns. Buraschi, Porchia, and Trojani (2010) found that marginal
returns are dependent on the optimal portfolio size, whereas Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009) concluded
that portfolio size inversely related to the start-ups potential and riskiness (i.e., IVCs prefer larger
portfolio when ventures have the low potential and high risk and vice versa). Dhochak and Sharma
(2016) mentioned that an investor has the limited ability to add value in new venture, so they have
to consider the size and scope of the portfolio accordingly.
Anticipating a success exit is the most crucial factor of an investment decision-making, because it is
directly proportionate to the returns. Thus, IVCs follow the number of pre-and postinvestment
activities for successful exit. Possibly the most critical value addition that an IVC can provide to the
portfolio firm is enabling the IPO, strategic merger, sale, or acquisition (Rajan, 2010). Large private
equity and IVC investors have well-connected networks and possess an in-depth understanding of
the capital markets (Rajan, 2010). Therefore, if the portfolio company wants to list as an IPO,
acquiring the best merchant banker and the ability to value the portfolio firm correctly is vital to
raising the expected funds (Rajan, 2010). The IVCs’ goal throughout the entire investment process is
to focus on achieving large financial returns on investments (Rajan, 2010). Dhochak and Sharma
(2016) argued exit strategies are equally significant at the initial screening process of a proposal.

Management Assessment of Independent Venture Capital Decision-Making
Venture capitalists realize that they are often betting on people when they make investment
decisions hoping their assessments of portfolio firm personnel are accurate (Blum, 2015). The
purpose of due diligence is to determine which business plans can eventually lead to a successful exit
by lessening adverse selection and reducing asymmetry of information between the preportfolio
company and the IVC (Flyvbjerg, 2013). Due diligence encompasses all activities deemed necessary
to evaluate an investment proposal (Sammut, 2012; Simic, 2015). Due diligence is measured by the
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total hours expended by the IVC conducting research on the portfolio firm (Flyvbjerg, 2013).
Flyvbjerg noted the time spent on due diligence is generally commensurate with the expected
funding size.
Each year, about 15% of business plan submissions reach the due-diligence stage (Metrick & Yasuda,
2011; Simic, 2015). From these 15%, only 5% are considered suitable for investment and enter
negotiation (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011; Simic, 2015). IVCs usually invest in less than 3% of business
plans submitted (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011; Simic, 2015).
During the due-diligence process, IVCs focus on reducing market, technology, management, and
governmental uncertainty (Blum, 2014). Because individuals are instrumental to success or failure
of a business, IVCs desire no uncertainty about the veracity and intentions of the management team
to advance a sustainable organization (Blum, 2014). In addition to the management team, duediligence research is conducted on current and predicted market and economic conditions, technology
adoption and challenges, regulatory environment, and competitive advantage (Lehtonen & Lahti,
2009). Although not an all-inclusive list, as part of the due-diligence process, IVCs (a) analyze
current and past financial statements, (b) review market comparables to determine valuation price,
(c) conduct varying market analysis, (d) review competitive advantage and market trends, (e)
determine whether the technology is disruptive and scalable, (f) decide whether the technology meets
an everyday need, (g) review provisional and approved patents, (h) review any pending legal action,
and (i) analyze local, state, and or federal regulatory issues (Blum, 2014; Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009).
The time to complete due diligence varies from 3 to 6 months (Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009). IVCs who
conduct extensive due diligence are more involved with supporting the portfolio firm realize higher
return on investment through a successful exit (Blum, 2014; Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009). Due diligence
is not just about empirical data but also qualitative factors.
IVCs often rely on “gut feelings,” personal chemistry, and value personal relationships with the
management team (Blum, 2014). IVCs want absolute confidence management understands the
technology, industry standards, and market demand before investing. Using qualitative and
quantitative factors, IVCs determine the length of involvement with the portfolio firm. Generally,
IVCs seek a 3- to 5-year relationship before exiting (Blum, 2014). Based on due diligence, IVCs can
determine valuation and funding requirements to achieve a successful exit based on high return on
investment. Funding usually starts at $10 million and can go up to $100 million or more through
funding phases (Blum, 2014).
During the due-diligence process, IVC firms focus on reducing investment risk. Before making a
financial investment, the IVC firm performs extensive research on the preportfolio firm’s product
line, management team, and internal and external competitive environments (Blum, 2014; Lehtonen
& Lahti, 2009). Due diligence is measured by the total hours spent performing research on the
preportfolio company (Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009).
IVC firms will review pending legal action, provisional and approved patents, market potential and
strategy, the competitive environment, and the portfolio firm’s competitive advantage (Lehtonen &
Lahti, 2009). The time spent by IVCs doing due diligence is generally proportionate to the
anticipated investment funding size (Blum, 2015). According to Lehtonen and Lahti (2009), the time
from screening to early funding is approximately 6 months. Yung (2009) countered that the average
was closer to 3 months. Either way, raising IVC funds is time-consuming and difficult. IVC firms
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who perform extensive due diligence, and are more involved in the postinvestment operations of the
portfolio firm experience, significantly higher ROI through a successful exit (Lehtonen & Lahti,
2009). Lehtonen and Lahti stated IVCs who focused on early funding opportunities experienced few
negative exits.

Management Due Diligence
Due diligence of the management team is crucial to deciding whether AS exists within the
preportfolio firm. Management due diligence is the process of evaluating and assessing the
effectiveness of the management team’s ability to achieve strategic objectives and manage risk
(Dobre, 2013). A consequence of IVC mistakes during managerial due diligence can mean the
difference between competitive advantage of the firm with a successful exit or sudden failure
resulting in bankruptcy (Dobre, 2013).
IVCs use management due-diligence processes to (a) ensure sustainable profit and growth for
organizations, (b) increase the chance of good returns on investment by reducing risk, (c) understand
strengths and weaknesses, (d) efficiently appraise the management team, and (e) assess
management team members' abilities to reach common goals (Benoliel, 2015; Boyle, Parmeter,
Boehlert, & Paterson, 2013; Flyvbjerg, 2013). Managerial due diligence identifies undiscovered
threats that might affect productivity such as unacknowledged motives, AS, or personal conflicts
between individual managers (Delak & Bajec, 2013). Management due diligence provides IVCs with
a foundation of knowledge for assessing the management team and individual manager performance
(Cooper, 2015). Based on due diligence, the IVC can determine whether nonconforming managers
need training or retraining or if they need to be dismissed to achieve organizational goals (Cooper,
2015).
The basis of due diligence of the management team is the understanding that significant tacit
knowledge exists with the individual manager, not necessarily in the firm’s documented processes,
procedures, and policies (Cooper, 2015). Traditionally, the most important aspect of the evaluation of
the portfolio company for the IVC is the experience and personality of the management team (Nunes,
Félix, & Pires, 2011). Characteristics IVCs look for in the management team are (a) hard workers,
(b) good delegators, (c) strategic thinkers with vision, and (d) an understanding of the organization’s
technology and market (Nunes et al., 2011). Knowledge of AS is also important for the organization
to remain competitive as abusive managers contribute to productivity losses, increased absenteeism,
increased health care costs, and lost trust. Over the course of the relationship with the portfolio firm,
IVCs continually evaluate the management team noticing significant changes in the character of the
team and organizational performance.
IVCs place importance on the quality of management because IVCs understand the business
environment will change, and management must be able to effectively react to competitive internal
and external threats, varying customer demands, new regulations, and other market and technology
dynamics. Having an abusive supervisor can negate the quality of the management team potentially
placing the competitive of the IVC investment at higher risk (Allen et al., 2010; Nunes et al., 2011).
Ensuring management is making correct tactical and strategic decisions are vital for the
organization’s success. IVCs want to ensure the management team can meet and overcome
challenges and not engage in deviant behaviors. If IVCs realize management teams are incomplete
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or a team member is nonconforming to company and societal standards of conduct, IVCs will often
recruit additional key talent (Blum, 2015).

Results
Because of high costs, disruptive nature, and detrimental effects of AS on the competitive advantage
of a preportfolio firm, IVCs need to be aware the effect AS has on employees and management. In
response to the research question: What tools, processes, and methods can IVCs use to detect AS
during the due-diligence process of the management team leading to successful exits, I explored
relevant tools, processes, and methods. My findings indicated IVCs could (a) use a 360-degree
feedback program, (b) conduct detailed background checks on the management team, (c) assess the
management team for AS, and (d) observe management in action. Given the significant costs abusive
managers can have for organizations, senior management is well advised to ameliorate and when
possible eliminate AS.

360-Degree Feedback
IVCs could use a 360-degree feedback program during the due-diligence process to observe whether
the management culture fosters civility among management and employees (Tepper et al., 2006).
The 360-degree feedback program is a system where subjects receive confidential and anonymous
feedback from managers, peers, and direct reports (Manning, 2013; Tee & Ahmed, 2014). Normally,
between eight and 12 people fill out an anonymous online feedback form with questions covering a
comprehensive range of workplace competencies (Manning, 2013). Responses are rated on a scale
from 1 (very satisfied) to 5 (very dissatisfied), with a provision for written comments (Manning,
2013). The subject of the feedback fills out a self-rating form with the same questions asked of
managers, peers, and direct reports (Manning, 2013). Managers use 360-feedback data to obtain a
better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of employees and other managers (Tepper et
al., 2006). Using the 360-degree feedback program helps to identify deviant behaviors such as AS in
individuals (Tee & Ahmed, 2014).

Conduct Background Checks
As part of due diligence, IVCs often request a list of references to contact and learn more about
management’s background and confirm whether the team might be financially backed (Brisbourne,
2011). As part of this background examination, IVCs could find occurrences of AS. Through the
management due-diligence process, IVCs develop an understanding of the primary gaps in the
management team. For AS, IVCs could review (a) the founders and their backgrounds (what is true,
what is not true); (b) disclosures of mental health issues; (c) disclosures of past and current employee
complaints; (d) employee confidentiality agreements; (e) past and current performance evaluations;
(f) experience commensurate with position; (g) investigative reports on all principals, managers, and
directors for instances of AS; (h) credit history reports on all principals, managers, and directors
(specifically looking for lawsuits placement on government registries and abnormal transactions
related to deviant behaviors); and (i) resume/curriculum vitae verification on all principals,
managers, and directors (Nunes et al., 2011).
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Assess the Management Team for AS
IVCs need to ask and receive satisfactory responses as to whether (a) managers exhibit a capacity for
sustained effort (DeCleyn & Braet, 2007); (b) the management team is flexible or rigid in its
orientation (MaRS, 2013); (c) management skills and personalities exhibit any signs of AS (MaRS,
2013); (d) the number of employees, turnover, absentee problems, and hiring projections indicate AS
is present (MaRS, 2013); (e) any manager is seen as an outlier (DeCleyn & Braet, 2007); (f)
personality conflicts and or mismatches exist within the management team (MaRS, 2013); (g) critical
resources managers have access to bank accounts (MaRS, 2013); and (h) managers evaluate risk well
(DeCleyn & Braet, 2007).
IVCs could use Tepper’s (2000) 15-item scale to assess for AS. Tepper’s scale consists of items
prefaced with the statement, “My boss…” Respondents use the following 5-point response scale: 1 (I
cannot remember him/her ever using this behavior with me), 2 (He/she very seldom uses this
behavior with me), 3 (He/she occasionally uses this behavior with me), 4 (He/she uses this behavior
moderately often with me), and 5 (He/she uses this behavior very often with me; Tepper, 2000, p. 189).
The items were as follow: (1) ridicules me, (2) tells me my thoughts or feelings are stupid, (3) gives
me the silent treatment, (4) puts me down in front of others, (5) invades my privacy, (6) reminds me
of my past mistakes and failures, (7) doesn’t give me credit for jobs requiring a lot of effort, (8) names
me to save himself/herself embarrassment, (9) breaks promises he/she makes, (10) expresses anger
at me when he/she is mad for another reason, (11) makes negative comments about me to others,
(12) is rude to me, (13) does not allow me to interact with my coworkers, (14) tells me I’m
incompetent, and (15) lies to me (Tepper, 2000, pp.189–190).

Observe the Management Team in Action
IVCs must observe how managers interact with employees when conducting due diligence on the
management team. IVCs might notice whether a manager is demeaning (Bowling & Michel, 2011).
The IVC need to notice if a manager is verbally disrespectful, belittles, or humiliates an employee
(Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002). The IVC could notice if a manager is controlling and isolates
employees (Michel, Newness, & Duniewicz, 2016). IVCs might review policies and procedures to
ensure conformance to standards (Mitchell, Vogel, & Folger, 2015). The IVC could notice if the
manager appears to lack confidence in employees by closely reviewing every detail of an employees
work such as wanting to see each e-mail sent and why and when the employee left his or her desk
(Tepper et al., 2011). The IVC could see if managers attempt to isolate employees from others (Duffy
et al., 2002). IVCs could observe whether managers trust employees by noticing the manager closely
watching what an employee does (Michel et al., 2016). IVCs need to notice if the manager speaks
unfavorably about an employee or former employees especially in front of coworkers (Bowling &
Michel, 2011). The IVC needs to speak with and interview a representative sample of employees to
decide if a manager exhibits AS (Nunes et al., 2011).

Study Limitations
The primary limitation of this study was scant extant research exists identifying IVCs being able to
detect AS during due-diligence process of the management team. This limitation was ameliorated by
the use of research available pertaining to IVCs and AS. Individually abundant literature exists on
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IVCs and AS but not specifically IVCs being able to detect AS during due-diligence process of the
management team. The second limitation was in not using primary data collection methods used
such as interviews, surveys, and questionnaires. IVCs being able to detect AS during due-diligence
process of the management team is unexplored and underexplored therefore the likelihood IVCs
would be able to sufficiently address the research question was deemed nil. The third limitation was
that the selection of the main research databases related to the topic. I am unable to guarantee all
AS, IVC, due-diligence articles in the extant were selected for review. The fourth limitation was that
I did not in applying the systematic literature method perform forward searches due to temporal and
resources constraints.

Conclusions and Recommendations
Finding AS among management is difficult because AS is a subjective assessment based on an
employee’s perceptions and within the context of the work environment (Tepper, 2000). Because of
the high cost associated with AS, IVCs and senior management at portfolio firms need to be educated
on the potential impacts of AS on staff to mitigate the effects of abuse and associated costs. In this
exploratory research, I provided information to bring awareness of AS to IVCs and offered tools,
processes, and methods IVCs can use to detect AS when conducting due diligence on the
management team. I answered the following research question: What tools, processes, and methods
can IVCs use to detect AS during the due-diligence process of the management team leading to
successful exits? My findings indicated IVCs need to (a) implement a 360-degree feedback program,
(b) conduct detailed background checks on the management team, (c) assess the management team
for AS, and (d) observe the management in action.
IVCs might become cognizant of AS. Otherwise, the portfolio company might experience (a) lower
employee retention rates, (b) higher employee turnover, (c) lower morale, (d) lower job satisfaction,
(e) diminishing trust of managers, which can create (f) conflict between work and family obligations,
(g) lessened commitment to the organization affecting organizational success, and (h) higher risk of
an unsuccessful exit. Managers could establish healthy working relationships to help ensure
competitive advantage of the company.
Regarding future research, I recommend follow-up research as to the specific instances related to
awareness of AS among IIVCs. Quantitative research should be considered for examining whether a
relationship exists between AS and management review and/or performance during due diligence.
Researchers should consider qualitative research by conducted interviews of IVCs to understand
whether IVCs are open to or use the findings from this study when conducting due diligence of the
management team.
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